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Liability to Deception and Manipulation: The Ethics of
Undercover Policing
CHRISTOPHER NATHAN
ABSTRACT Does undercover police work inevitably wrong its targets? Or are undercover
activities justiﬁed by a general security beneﬁt? In this article I argue that people can make
themselves liable to deception and manipulation. The debate on undercover policing will pro-
ceed more fruitfully if the tactic can be conceptualised along those lines, rather than as essen-
tially ‘dirty hands’ activity, in which people are wronged in pursuit of a necessary good, or in
instrumentalist terms, according to which the harms of undercover work are straightforwardly
overcome by its beneﬁts. This article motivates the ‘liability view’ and describes its attractions,
challenges, and implications.
Introduction
Undercover police act in ways that are, in normal circumstances, ways of wronging
people. Their actions cause several kinds of harms and setbacks to people’s lives. Tar-
gets can be deceived, manipulated, have their privacy invaded, have their material
interests set back, be encouraged to act in ways that are themselves wrong, and ofﬁ-
cers may omit to act in ways that would prevent harm. Being subject to acts of con-
certed deception and manipulation can lead to uncertainty about one’s social sphere,
and having the grounds for trust in this is constitutive of a general good, or is neces-
sary for others. Consider the case of Mark Jenner, an undercover ofﬁcer in the United
Kingdom who gathered intelligence on the Colin Roach Centre, a group that had the
goal of exposing police corruption and racism. He obtained information about the
group by having a long-term relationship with one of its members. The victim of the
deception now talks of her need for a ‘grieving process’, and of the way in which her
relationship with him has coloured all of her subsequent relationships.1 Even when
people do not ever discover the fact of manipulation, it is arguable that a harm has
occurred. If truth or success are elements of a good life, then deceptive police activity
has the potential to set back people’s interests by rendering their projects unfulﬁlled or
corrupted.
What would an ideal structure of undercover policing activities look like? In this
article I propose the notion of liability as a guiding ethical concept. According to this
idea, those who engage in wrongdoing make themselves morally liable to preventive
activities.2 These can involve methods that are harmful and would otherwise be
wrongful. Given the recent prominence and usefulness of the concept of liability in
other areas of applied philosophy, including in its relation to criminal justice and pun-
ishment,3 we can expect it to be a fruitful concept in a policing context. It has thus far
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received little attention in work on the justiﬁcation and ethics of policing.4 Further-
more, remarkably, the laws in the United Kingdom governing undercover policing pay
little due to the concept, even though it is both a highly plausible norm, and is
expressed in other elements of the governance of policing.5
The Dirty Hands Model
One way of understanding the moral status of undercover work is as a case of dirty
hands. As one undercover police ofﬁcer said when asked about the ethics of his work,
‘that’s like trying to invent dry water or ﬁreproof coal’.6 The view often attributed to
Machiavelli is that power inevitably involves doing some things that are wrongs, arising
from genuine moral dilemmas. We must accept this moral residue, but we also do bet-
ter not to dwell on our misdeeds. On this view, committing moral wrongs is part of
the core of undercover work. The best we can do is to embrace the values we gain: in
this case, the reduction of crime and the increase in security. It retains, nonetheless, a
tragic element, since it is necessary that the work is performed, and those who perform
it commit wrongs, thereby performing a sacriﬁce.7
The dirty hands model is unsatisfying. A public that takes on board this view of
manipulative policing will correctly feel that it puts wrongful acts at the centre of
police practice. The wrongs may be justiﬁed by appeal to necessity, but unease will
remain. Furthermore, one can reasonably expect that the effects of an internalisation
of a dirty hands ethic by agents of a practice that is inherently secretive would be to
encourage further secretiveness. A belief on the part of its agents that the practice is
not wrongful is more conducive to public justiﬁcation and regulation.
The Instrumental Model
An alternative view holds that covert work is justiﬁed where its harms are outweighed
by its beneﬁts. Call this the ‘instrumental’ model. The instrumental model is in evi-
dence in its purest form in contexts outside of undercover policing. Consider foreign
signals intelligence. As General Michael Hayden, former head of the US National
Security Agency, recently said, ‘I am simply going out there to retrieve information
that helps keep my countrymen free and safe. This is not about guilt . . . NSA doesn’t
just listen to bad people. NSA listens to interesting people.’8 In foreign intelligence,
there is no strong or established practice of due process. Rather, the focus is upon efﬁ-
cacy. The answer to the question of whether or not resources, including privacy-
intruding resources, should be expended in one area rather than another is determined
by the outcome of a cost-beneﬁt analysis.
What if this set of norms were extended from foreign signals intelligence into the
domestic context involving undercover agents? Such a state of affairs has precedent.
Consider the historic involvement of the intelligence services in the British Communist
Party:
In the international communist movement, the British party was a laughing
stock, correctly assumed to be so thoroughly penetrated that it was virtually a
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branch of the Security Service. As Roger Hollis [Director General of MI5]
told the home secretary in 1959, ‘we [have] the British Communist Party
pretty well buttoned up.’ It was more than mere containment, says [David]
Cornwell [MI5/MI6 Ofﬁcer], who ran agents into the party. ‘We kept it
aﬂoat. In fact, we owned it’.9
Around half a million ﬁles were made on communists or communist sympathisers,
of which twenty thousand were members of the British Communist Party – but of all
of these, only a few were ever prosecuted. How are we to interpret these numbers? A
justiﬁcation of this practice would have to begin within what I am calling the instru-
mental view. The use of security resources in order to spy on people in virtue of
their political views, without any aspiration towards criminal prosecution, could only
be explained on the grounds that the practice serves some more general security
aims.
The instrumental view is not attractive. Whereas the dirty hands view clings too
ﬁrmly to the status of covert policing as wrongful, the instrumental view is uncomfort-
ably blas!e. Intrusions by undercover police can take place against people who are not
believed to be involved in any wrongdoing. A stark example is in the FBI’s effort to
locate fugitives from the Weather Underground faction of Students for a Democratic
Society:
A federal agent posing as a radical inﬁltrated a student milieu thought to be
close to this faction. He developed a relationship with a political activist, and
she became pregnant. After considerable indecision, and at the urging of the
agent, she had an abortion. His efforts did not locate the fugitive. The agent’s
work then took him elsewhere, and he ended the relationship. The woman
apparently never learned of his secret identity and true motives.10
That is an extreme case.11 We now know such a practice has taken place in the UK
over a number of years. Secondary intrusions of a less powerful kind are likely to be
extremely common. As one author notes: ‘A typical undercover operation with strong
intelligence aimed at drug trafﬁcking will enable ofﬁcers to draw up a detailed picture
of the private lives of those involved, and their associates, innocent or otherwise.’12
The trouble with the instrumental view is that it gives no direct differential ethical
consideration to those who are (a) useful targets who are acting criminally; (b) useful
targets who are not criminal or otherwise wrongful actors; and (c) those affected col-
laterally by the targeting of others. Intuitively, those are different cases. Let us develop
a more convincing position.
The Liability Model and Self-Defence
According to a natural viewpoint, we should have little sympathy for those whose
interests are set back by covert policing, where those investigated are correctly sus-
pected of involvement in crime. How can we account for this? It seems to be a case of
a forfeiture of rights. The criminal’s wrongful plans and behaviours cancel the moral
complaint he would otherwise have. We can theorise this view by appeal to the princi-
ples that arise from considerations of personal self-defence. These cases provide a
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useful guide for our intuition, since they are structurally similar: they are also cases of
rights-forfeiture.
Complaints
Distinguish ﬁrst between an infringement and violation of a right. A ‘rights violation’
is a rights infringement that is not justiﬁed. A ‘rights infringement’ engages a right and
gives rise to a complaint, but may on balance be justiﬁed.13 In a paradigm case of self-
defence, one is morally permitted to use force in order to overcome a culpable threat.
In so doing, one does not infringe upon the rights of one’s attacker. Rather, by culpa-
bly creating the threat, the attacker forgoes his right not to be harmed. In the case of
an innocent threat, we respond differently. Suppose someone will harm you through
no fault of her own – she is going to fall onto you – and you can divert her body away
from you, thereby harming her and saving yourself. In that case, it seems that by
defending yourself, you (arguably justiﬁably) infringe upon the rights of the innocent
threat. The culpable attacker, on the other hand, by creating a threat, loses a right not
to be harmed. This is not just because by harming one’s attacker, one saves oneself,
but because of the attacker’s responsibility for creating the threat.
The intuition that guides these cases also appears to be at work in cases of manipu-
lative or deceptive police investigation. The man who takes part in an online child
pornography distribution ring makes himself liable to kinds of state action that set
back his interests. These actions include his being systematically tricked, so that he
reveals facts about himself and those using the ring. In taking part in the ring, he for-
goes a number of rights, including his right against being deceived and manipulated.
The harm that this person has unleashed is something that can be prevented or miti-
gated partly through means that impose direct costs upon him. He is morally culpable
for a threat in the sense that he is responsible for a possible harm; his actions render
him liable to being used as a means to the end of preventing or mitigating that
harm.14
Compare that case to the known-innocent subject of useful deception. Sometimes it
will be useful for covert police to deceive or manipulate those who are uninvolved in
any criminal wrongdoing.15 For example, police may spy on the family, sexual part-
ners, or travel agent of their primary targets. Suppose that the intrusion is small and
the security beneﬁt is great. If such practices are ever on balance justiﬁed, many will
still sense that those on the receiving end have their rights infringed. This contrasts
with our sense that the culpable have no complaint at all.16
Proportionality
Proportionality constraints apply in self-defence cases. Suppose B threatens only a
minor violation of A’s personal space: B threatens to step on A’s foot. In this case it is
not permissible for A to shoot B dead as a preventive measure, even if this is the only
way to avoid the threat. Similarly, ethical proportionality considerations apply in polic-
ing. The recent activities of police ofﬁcers in inﬁltrating UK protest groups appears to
the general public disproportionate – especially in going to the extreme depths of
deception involved in having and raising children with their targets.17 In these cases,
the harm to be prevented was direct public protest action. Is this undercover action a
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proportionate measure against a group whose most clear plan is to close down a power
station for a week, with the goal of seeking media attention on environmental issues?
Many would think not.
Proportionality in self-defence involves comparing not only the harm threatened and
the harm used to avert the threat, but also the attacker’s culpability for the threat. One
whose slight negligence gives rise to a threat of some small harm, H, makes himself
liable to less defensive harm than one who maliciously aims at H. (I return to this in
the following section.) On this view, then, just as a higher degree of culpability makes
a threat liable to a greater self-defensive force, so also does a higher degree of culpabil-
ity make a criminal liable to more intrusive or harmful investigative practices.
Innocent threats, of course, might warrant justiﬁed self-defensive force,18 and so
also in the case of policing does it seem that culpability for a possible harm is not a
necessary condition for on-balance-justiﬁed manipulation or intrusion. Proportionality
considerations apply. One does not forfeit all of one’s rights against being harmed sim-
ply in virtue of being any threat at all; rather, one becomes more liable to intrusion
and manipulation where, other things being equal, one is more responsible for the
possible harm that is to be prevented.19 The key point is that where the target of cov-
ert police work is culpable for a possible harm, intrusive and manipulative policing
action can take place in a way that does not violate rights. In the governance of covert
police work, this idea suggests that intrusion on the culpable ought to be less restricted
than intrusion on the non-culpable.20
Imperfect Knowledge
Compare two cases. In the ﬁrst, there are reasonable grounds to believe that person A
is involved in serious criminal activity. The police inﬁltrate A’s social grouping, and
prevent A from acting in the way she intended. In the second, there are reasonable
grounds to believe that person B is involved in serious criminal activity. The police
inﬁltrate B’s social grouping, and discover that B is not involved in serious criminal
activity. Suppose that the inﬁltration creates setbacks for both A and B: they are
manipulated, their privacy is intruded upon, their lives are affected in ways that they
would not choose. What do we say about these cases? In the ﬁrst case, we tend to feel
that A has no ground for complaint regarding the setback she faces. She made herself
liable to the harms of deception and manipulation. In relation to her planned acts, the
harms she incurs in the course of the investigation do not just pale in comparison; a
common intuition has no sympathy at all. It holds that A has not been wronged. On
the other hand, in cases of the second sort, we tend to interrogate the facts of the case.
Was there really reasonable suspicion? Was there an abuse of process? Did the police
follow its own codes of best practice? Should these be altered? We are unlikely to hold
that B has not been wronged at all. If the facts of the case are urged upon us – there
were reasonable grounds for suspicion, these were faulty, and nobody acted, ex ante,
in error – then we still feel sympathy for B, and furthermore, sense that he has a legiti-
mate complaint.
We can draw upon one prominent account of analogous intuitions in the context
of self-defence in order to develop this thought.21 Suppose X suspects that Y is cul-
pable for some threat to X, and holds this belief with likelihood p. At some levels of
p, it must be reasonable for to X to engage in acts of self-defence. If X’s beliefs turn
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out to be mistaken, and Y in fact posed no threat, then we want to say that X acted
wrongly, at least in the sense that Y has been wronged. It also seems correct to say
that X acted reasonably. Our norms cannot tell someone who reasonably but mistak-
enly believes he is under attack that he should not respond with force, and our
norms also cannot say of someone who reasonably but mistakenly believed he was
under attack that he acted rightly. If this is the correct view (bearing in mind that
other positions on fact- and evidence-relative obligations are available),22 then in our
analogy to covert police work, the manipulation of an innocent infringes upon his
rights, even if the fact of his innocence becomes accessible only after the manipula-
tion. He has a complaint even where the manipulation is the result of reasonable but
mistaken suspicion.
Apart from being culpable for a threat, one can also become liable to defensive force
by being culpable for causing people to believe that one is a threat. Suppose that as
part of a provocative conceptual art project someone dresses up as a bank robber,
withdraws some of his own cash from the bank desk, and dashes out of the building
with the money in a sack labelled ‘swag’.23 This may warrant some police attention.
The analogy to self-defence is now helpful. This case is equivalent to one in which a
person performs acts that create the impression of a threat, even when there is none.
In both cases it will be a matter of degree and context how far we deem the act wrong
in itself as a needless creation of fear and disruption, and how far we deem it a
humorous poke at a culture of excessive security. In neither case is the person culpable
for a threat. Now suppose police deploy intrusive methods upon the joke bank robber,
on the grounds of the reasonable suspicion that he created. That is a case that we
judge differently to one in which a target becomes subject to reasonable but mistaken
suspicion through no fault of her own. And similarly, if we apply the reasoning of the
previous paragraph, defensive harm to a person who one reasonably but falsely
believes to be a threat does inﬂict a wrong, even if it was one that it was reasonable to
inﬂict.
Developing the Model
The liability model is attractive, and avoids the problems of the dirty hands and
instrumentalist views. It allows us to say that at least some covert police work is not
rights-infringing, and that other such work may be rights-infringing but justiﬁed on
balance.24 It makes a sharp distinction between police work that impacts harmfully
on those who are culpable, and police work that impacts harmfully on the innocent.
I suggest, further, that it provides a useful tool for thinking about policy. By
abstracting away from the immediate politics of the question, it facilitates reﬂection
on ideal practice. If we are to develop a plausible ethic of covert policing, this
seems to be the correct path to follow. Nonetheless, it is incomplete. In this section
I will indicate several areas in which it needs development. These are: the details of
the connections between personal self-defence and policing; its connection to the
ethical controversy over self-defence; its revisionary potential regarding police judg-
ment of responsibility; the non-imminence of threats in policing cases; the question
of culpability for inevitably defeated threats; and the deployment of police against
harmless wrongs.
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From Self-Defence to Policing
There are several ways in which we might think about the connection between the
ethics of self-defence and the ethics of policing. I will describe three possibilities: a
direct connection, an analogy, and an appeal to common root principle.
The direct connection appeals to a social contract. One way of understanding and
justifying police power is to proceed in Lockean terms, according to which we each
surrender to the state our natural right to enact justice personally.25 Such a view is
consonant with the police’s historical aspiration to ‘policing by consent’. That slogan
evokes an agreement into which those who are policed voluntarily enter. According
to this view, personal self-defence is one kind of individual enactment of justice, and
police are agents of our own powers. They carry out a function that each of us car-
ries out for ourselves in a state of nature. If police act on our behalf in this way, then
one would expect that there are cases in a non-state context in which individuals
may act in the way that police may act. This approach takes the self-defence idea
quite literally. Police step in and protect us using means that, were there no police
force, we would have a right (and need) to use ourselves. The surrender of this indi-
vidual right of self-protection to the state has the advantage of introducing means
that are unavailable in the individual case: personal self-defence does not provide the
resources for an intelligence operation, but by collectively passing on these rights to
the state, we enable yet greater protections, such as the use of concerted manipula-
tion and deception.
The appeal to self-defence need not be so literal. Instead of running the view
through the apparatus of a social contract, we may instead focus upon the compa-
rable structure of cases of personal self-defence, and cases of manipulative policing.
As I have shown, in asking who has a legitimate complaint, both undercover polic-
ing and personal self-defence evoke similar forms of response. We might thereby
conclude that the coherence of our network of intuitions is improved by bringing
the cases in to contact and examining how the principles in one case will read
across in to the other – and where, if they do not, what makes the relevant differ-
ence. Furthermore, in the personal self-defence case, we take away the issues con-
cerning the way in which police act as agents of citizens – that is, issues of abuse
of power and use of discretion – and focus on the principles governing what police
can legitimately aim to do. This gives reason to think that examining personal self-
defence as an analogy for policing provides in one way a purer test for certain
intuitions.
A third way to move from personal self-defence to policing is by generalisation of
principle rather than direct analogy. In the self-defence case, individuals respond
themselves to threats. In the policing case, the response to the threat is made by an
agent of the individual threatened. The similarity is sufﬁcient to expect a congruence
of governing principle. For example, in the context of discussing criminal legislation
that has a preventive goal, Kimberley Ferzan argues that if we are committed to intu-
itive principles of self-defence, then we thereby commit ourselves to analogous princi-
ples of preventive state action.26 These aren’t the same principles, but they have the
same root. In both cases, comparable considerations relating to the idea of liability
seem to apply.27
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Culpability and Other Elements of Liability
To be culpable for a threat is to be blameworthy for a threat that is unjustiﬁed. If only
the culpable are liable to defensive harm,28 then the innocent target of useful police
manipulation is on a moral par with the bystander who is used as a shield against a
threat. Such innocents have a moral complaint, though harm against them might still
be justiﬁed on the weight of good consequences.
Factors other than culpability may be relevant to liability to self-defensive harm.
Some hold that a thin notion of responsibility for an action can make a person liable
to defensive harm.29 Call this the ‘agency’ view. An individual is agent responsible for
an action where the action can be attributed to her: she freely chose the action, was of
sound mind, and so forth. One would be agent responsible but not culpable for a
threat to a pedestrian’s life if one’s well-maintained car runs out of control towards
him as one drives past. Others hold that the innocent can be liable to defensive harm
by posing a threat that would also violate a person’s rights, even where no agency is
involved on the part of the innocent in creating the threat.30 Call this the ‘unjust
threat’ view.
How might the agency and unjust threat views play out in a policing context? They
would be more permissive. Many activities involve risks of imposing or facilitating a
harm. As the head of an internet service provider, you risk hosting communications
channels that are used for the purposes of paedophile groups. This risk will generate
some duty to cooperate with police. Furthermore, on the agency view, it may also
make one liable to intrusive state activities, such as surveillance or ‘equipment interfer-
ence’ (i.e. hacking), if those are among the most effective ways of mitigating the threat.
Similarly, on the agency and unjust threat views, if one takes part in a political group
that has a hidden violent wing, one may thereby become liable to a degree of manipu-
lative inﬁltration tactics, even if the violent goals of the group are well-hidden, insofar
as one (unknowingly) contributes to the threat. If the members of the family, the
lover, or travel agent, of a serious criminal contribute to the threat he poses, then, on
this position, they too make themselves liable to some preventive harm, even if this
contribution is unintended and the criminality is hidden from their view.
It is beyond the scope of this article to make a ruling on the scope of liability to
defensive harm. Crucially, there is general agreement that culpability is a factor that
feeds in to proportionality, even if it is not necessary for non-rights-infringing defensive
harm.31 That is, other things equal, those who are more culpable are liable to more
harm.
Judgments of Responsibility
This is a welcome result. Consider a stylised operational context in which police have
a choice of two strategies. They may inﬁltrate a group by focusing manipulative and
deceitful efforts at one of two elements of a group. One element of the group is
exploited by the other. The former is made up of people who are recruited from a
young age, are dependent on the drugs the group supplies them, and have reason to
fear physical assault should they show disloyalty. The latter receives the lion’s share of
the remuneration of the group’s activities, and is made up of a smaller number of peo-
ple who are powerful enough to choose their actions and are fully aware of their
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effects. This example raises the question, is there any reason to prefer the manipula-
tion of the second group over the ﬁrst, keeping constant the expected operational out-
come? At the very least, it seems there is some (non-decisive) reason to prefer
manipulative efforts that target the second group, because those whose interests are to
be set back by such activities are more culpable and so more liable to intrusive tactics.
Compare this to the way in which the equivalent point works in the debate on just
war. It is often argued that since facts are so difﬁcult to acquire in war, we would
have to wait until ‘laser-guided weaponry [is complemented] with guilt-seeking mis-
siles’ before the culpability view of war makes it possible to kill justly.32 Many com-
batants are not individually morally responsible for the threat posed by the force of
which they are a part – they may be conscripts, they may deliberately ﬁre their guns
so that they miss – and there is no way for their adversary to differentiate which
these are. On the other hand, police do have access to many facts, and are equipped
with processes that seek truths. Part of an investigation’s purpose, unlike a war, is to
seek out truths.
This gives rise to a concern. By incorporating the liability view in to our policing
practices, we might expand police beyond their traditional role. If police are asked to
express and act upon full moral judgments of culpability, do we blur the traditional
divide between the role of investigators and that of courts? If, in acting covertly or in
authorising and managing a covert operation, ofﬁcers must judge not only the degree
of threatened harm, but also the degree of full moral responsibility for the threat, then
they will have to make judgments of the kind that would normally be reserved until a
trial, when questions of circumstances mitigating a punishment are raised, or when
defences relating to insanity or necessity are made. This runs against a popular under-
standing of the role of police: they exist in order to prevent harms and to facilitate the
judgment of the court. The liability view would seem to recruit them also into the pro-
cess of judgment.
The tension may be mitigated with a requirement for judicial warrants for under-
cover operations, as the UK Government’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legis-
lation has recently recommended.33 But more generally, we may be better off rejecting
the sharp distinction between the judicial and investigative roles, accepting that police
work itself involves close ethical judgments of responsibility. Indeed, we do this
already in accepting police discretion.34 The view of proportionality that excludes cul-
pability has the beneﬁt that it yields a position in which police judge only whether or
not an action is occurring. But it has the cost that it yields a position in which police
are in principle indifferent between imposing hardships on the exploited and the
exploiter, if the expected operational outcome is similar.
Urgency
There are differences between self-defence and policing cases. A prominent difference
is urgency. In self-defence cases a key issue is whether the attacker is (or would be)
culpable for the harm that would occur, were no defensive intervention to take place.
Paradigm cases involve waiting until the attack is imminent. Pre-emptive strikes are
difﬁcult to justify. Police interventions, on the other hand, take place in slower motion.
The immediacy is not present. An express goal of covert police work is to facilitate
an intervention well before a threatened criminal harm occurs. This might be thought
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to provide a relevant difference between the moralities of personal self-defence
and policing.
However, the most plausible reason for the need for immediacy in cases of legiti-
mate personal self-defence is that before the attack is imminent, it is typically not the
case that it can be established with sufﬁcient certainty that self-defensive force is nec-
essary in order to avert the threat. In the case of policing, where the information-
attaining power of the state is at work, things are different. Police can be aware that
an individual threatens a harm far in advance of his placing his ﬁnger on a trigger.
Culpable For What?
If a person is, or would be, culpable for a possible harm, then she forgoes a right
against harmful intervention. We can understand the referent of ‘harm’ so that it is
the exact harm that would occur, were preventive force not to be used. This gives rise
to a possible disanalogy between policing and personal self-defensive cases. This is
well-illustrated with a police sting. From a certain perspective, someone who offers to
sell contraband to a police ofﬁcer who is acting undercover threatens no harm at all. If
the sale goes ahead, the goods will be destroyed. It seems that the right comparison is
not with a pure case of personal self-defence. In those cases, if the attacker is not
deﬂected, a harm occurs. The right comparison appears to be to an attacker who,
unknown to him, has been rendered safe. His gun was emptied of bullets earlier by
the person who is to be threatened. Just as the sale of contraband to police will not
involve the distribution of goods into the wrong hands, so the unwittingly disarmed
attacker will be unable to cause a harm if he pulls his trigger. Is it permissible to harm
the unwittingly disarmed in order to prevent him from carrying out what he wrongly
believes would be a harmful attack? The intuitive answer is ‘no’. After all, what good
comes of this harm? By hypothesis, if he pulls his trigger, nothing will happen. But
what police do when they carry out a sting is equivalent to harming an unwittingly dis-
armed attacker. Does that mean that police stings are impermissible – or is there a
morally relevant disanalogy between stings and harm to attackers who cannot succeed?
One response would be to subjectivise fully the understanding of harm. On this
view, if someone is culpable for what she believes is a possible harm, then she forgoes
a right against intervention. This would retain the analogy between the sting and the
self-defence case, but deny the intuition that we cannot harm the disarmed attacker.
That intuition is difﬁcult to abandon. We can do better than that. Policing and per-
sonal self-defence cases have an important similarity, which is that it is difﬁcult to
describe instances of genuinely harmless unwittingly disarmed attackers. Those whose
attacks fail by one means are likely to ﬁnd others. And those whose sales of contra-
band fail by one means are likely to ﬁnd others. Someone who sells illicit goods to a
police ofﬁcer who is acting under cover also threatens to perform the same harm in
selling such goods to those who would use them. We would do better to understand
the threatened harm in this case to be wider than just the imminent harm of selling
the goods involved in the sting, but also the implied threat to continue to deal in con-
traband. If so, the police operation can, after all, be morally comparable to a case of
self-defence. It is an intervention at a non-imminent stage of the threat.
How do we deal with intrusions and manipulations where a target’s plans and activi-
ties are not criminal at all, including any inchoate offence? Consider, for example, the
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recent case in which a paid informant for the New York Police Department’s intelli-
gence unit was under orders to ‘bait’ Muslims into making remarks in favour of terror-
ism.35 Leaving aside for the moment the issues of entrapment, to which I return
below, and assuming for the sake of argument that the strategy has some security
value, it is relevant here that manipulations were visited upon those not suspected of
posing any threat. The liability view handles this case well. Police involvement where
there is not yet a crime, even an inchoate crime, is comparable to self-defence where
there is not yet a threat, but only a possible future threat. Culpability on the part of
the purported future threat is absent and such cases therefore fall under the heading
of intrusions that must be justiﬁed by the high bar of a preponderance of good conse-
quences, analogous to harming the innocent bystander in exchange for a signiﬁcant
beneﬁt.
Prospective Harms, Retrospective Wrongs, and Harmless Wrongs
In working from principles of self-defence, it appears that we are able only to consider
possible future harms. The self-defence model involves a possible harm that can be
prevented. An individual who has previously carried out some unjust threat, and no
longer poses a further threat, does not call for defensive action. This points us towards
the conclusion that police, as understood through the lens of the liability model,
should be prepared to make greater intrusions in preventing criminal acts, than they
would be in pursuing criminals for prosecution, where there is reason to believe that
the person is unlikely to reoffend.
In practice the distinction between investigating the threatened and the unpunished
crime will often be invisible. That an individual has committed a crime and has faced
no reprimand is some evidence that he will commit further crimes. Nonetheless, the
implication remains that a credibly repentant unpunished elderly war criminal is liable
to less intrusion than a conspiring war-criminal-to-be. That is not counterintuitive.
But it is questionable that the credibly repentant criminal is liable to the same level of
intrusion as the pure innocent, and that seems to be the case on the liability model,
since both the innocent and the reformed but unpunished criminal are equally non-
threats. Is it ever permissible for undercover police to deploy with an entirely retro-
spective outlook? The liability model seems to give a presumption against this.
Furthermore, by requiring that liability to harmful investigation is predicated upon a
threatened harm, it seems that we preclude the possibility that those involved in harm-
less but justiﬁably criminalised wrongs can make themselves liable to seriously intru-
sive investigations. In practice, again, this may be of relatively little consequence. The
kinds of acts that intuitively make a person liable to the deception and manipulation
that attach to undercover police work typically tend towards harm. As well as more
immediate harms such as the sale of weapons, the facilitation of the communications
of a terrorist group, or the distribution of child pornography, indirectly harmful activ-
ity such as money laundering may also create liability to intrusive investigation in vir-
tue of its contribution towards destructive organised criminal institutions. Some may
take the view that illicit drug sales can be harmless but also create liability to intrusive
investigation. Such sales may be harmless in the sense that each transaction represents
a genuine Pareto improvement. But they may give rise to liability to intrusive investi-
gation since drug distribution networks typically engage in serious crimes on an
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organised scale, and investigations into individual sellers may allow police access to
intelligence about the more deeply harmful workings of the group. However, such a
case would better be understood as one of indirect harm: the degree of involvement in
the institution of the drug market that is typically necessary to act as a seller may itself
be counted as perpetuating a harm – and insofar as it is not, we are less inclined to
say that the seller is liable to heavily manipulative police involvement.
The issues of retrospective wrongs and harmless crimes give rise to the question of
how far the liability view will extend. Is the self-defence analogy appropriate for all
coercive police activity, including in its responses to less serious crimes, and to cases
where no actual or future harm is involved? An ecumenical approach holds that the
liability view itself is consistent with the existence of police goals other than the pre-
vention of harm. It commits us to the idea that, other things being equal, a greater
degree of culpability on the part of the target makes her liable to greater deception
and manipulation. That claim permits that police may have other reasons to use
undercover methods against a person. The facilitation of just punishment is one such
possible reason.
It is possible, nonetheless, to sketch a view that has a stricter role for the idea of
liability, drawing on the work of Victor Tadros on punishment.36 Those who create a
threat but are thereafter bystanders are liable to defensive harm in a way that pure
bystanders are not. For example, suppose that in defending yourself against a bomb
that cannot be defused, you can choose to throw either the person who set the explo-
sives in the way of the blast, or an innocent. It seems that you should use the person
who set the explosives. People can be liable to such ‘opportunistic’ harm if they are
responsible for the threat. The person who creates the threat incurs this liability
because he has a duty to avert it. He may also have a duty to avert other threats to
the victim, particularly if he is unable to avert this particular threat. If one way of
discharging that latter duty is through the general deterrence effect of punishment,
then police will be warranted in using harmful methods, including deceptive and
manipulative methods, for the purposes of facilitating the courts in bringing people
to judgment.
A further possibility that should not be overlooked is that people can be liable to the
kind of seriously harmful policework involved in undercover operations only with
regard to its preventive, and not punitive, goals. On this view, the facilitation of pure
retribution is not a ground for police manipulation, any more than people are morally
permitted to take purely retributive actions where it is clear that no good would arise
from doing so.37
Implications
In the previous section I described a series of issues that the liability model of manipu-
lative policing must face. A core idea of the model is that the extent to which individu-
als are liable to manipulative and deceptive policing methods is partly a function of
the degree to which they are culpable for a possible harm. In this section I discuss
what an adoption of this model would mean for the governance of policing. First, I
describe the governance structure one might expect. Second, I outline and rebut an
argument that the liability model is in practice virtually identical to the instrumentalist
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view. Finally, I discuss the implications for intelligence-led covert police work and
entrapment.
Governance Structure
What kind of governance model would be warranted by the liability view? I will men-
tion three features. These are: proportionality to harm, proportionality to culpability,
and compensation for epistemically justiﬁed wrongs and consequentially justiﬁed
harms. In the present governance structure in the United Kingdom, only the ﬁrst of
these is given proper due.
First, one would expect that greater intrusions and manipulations are warranted for
those suspected of involvement in more serious crimes. The liability model expressly
builds in a proportionality constraint that makes appeal to the harm that this threat-
ened. This feature is built in to the current regime in the United Kingdom. The pro-
cess under the existing legislation, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
(RIPA), requires that an authorising ofﬁcer consider both the necessity of the action,
and its proportionality to the seriousness of the crime to be investigated.
Second, one would expect a governance structure that requires a higher bar to be
met in authorising an operation where the culpability on the part of those to be
affected by the operation is believed to be lower. For example, if there is good reason
to think that a person is directly involved in a crime, that person is liable to manipula-
tion; but if someone is believed merely to be a useful target of manipulation, and there
is little reason to believe she is culpable, then the justiﬁcation of using undercover
methods against her should be more difﬁcult.
Remarkably, RIPA does not pay due to this requirement. It does not ask that autho-
rising ofﬁcers consider the extent to which there is reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing
or criminality. It appeals instead to necessity and proportionality. It does require that
‘collateral intrusion’ is minimised – i.e. intrusion upon those who are not the ‘target’
of the investigation. But the accompanying Codes of Practice, including the most
recent one which was issued in December 2014, state that usefully-intruded-upon
innocents are not to be treated as ‘collateral intrusions’, but fall under the same stan-
dard of proportionality that is applicable to the suspected criminal.38 Targets them-
selves are therefore to be selected according to security efﬁcacy, without taking
account taken of possible culpability or other concepts that are connected to liability,
such as reasonable suspicion.39
Third, one would expect a governance structure that takes account of the epistemi-
cally justiﬁed wrongs and consequentially justiﬁed harms that police may commit. The
former category involves, as we have seen, the wronging of innocents who are subject
to manipulative police work, where there are reasonable but erroneous grounds for
suspicion of their wrongdoing. If it turns out that the target is innocent (and not
otherwise liable), then on the liability view he will have a moral complaint that he
would not have were he involved in malicious activities.
Consequentially justiﬁed harms are those that occur against people who are not
liable, but that are justiﬁed by a preponderance of good consequences. Even where
there are no grounds for suspicion of involvement in wrongdoing, or even positive evi-
dence of innocence, it is still possible that deception and manipulation are useful and
justiﬁed, but this justiﬁcation will need to cross the high bar of the kind that is
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analogous to a justiﬁcation of harming an innocent bystander for the sake of some very
signiﬁcant beneﬁt.
In the cases of both epistemically justiﬁed wrongs and consequentially justiﬁed
harms, a moral complaint remains, and so one would expect that where possible an
appropriate form of recompense would be available to those who have a legitimate
complaint. Compensation plausibly begins with a form of recognition. One might
therefore expect that an element of this recompense would take the form the provision
of information after the operation. This tells against the exceptionless principle of ‘nei-
ther conﬁrm nor deny’ that is claimed by police in the United Kingdom in this
regard.40 That stance precludes the ﬁrst step towards recognition of these wrongs that
are a part of police activity.41 To be sure, there will be cases in security considerations
will override the pro tanto reason for transparency about the facts of an expired investi-
gation. However, our current context is one in which there is precedent for the release
of more information in a way that does not threaten security.42 The next step would
be a positive institutional effort at identiﬁcation of information that can be released to
those who have been wronged in this way.
Is the Second Implication Undetectable?
It may be the case that even if the rules governing the use of covert police do not leg-
islate for sensitivity to culpability, there are, nonetheless, criminological facts and insti-
tutional pressures or habits that render it likely that the rules are applied in a way that
responds to culpability. A reason to believe this is that police are typically involved
with criminals. Why is this the case? The crime level is high, in comparison to the
levels of resources present to combat it. Undercover policing is a relatively expensive
strategy. The natural way to deploy this resource is to use it against those who are
strongly suspected of committing crimes. In this context, where suspicion is plentiful
in comparison with the resources that might be deployed to meet it, it would be waste-
ful to use policing resources anywhere else. Perhaps – continues the argument – there
is a possible world in which the ratio of crime to crime-prevention resources is differ-
ent. In that world, it becomes efﬁcient for crime-prevention purposes to use covert
ofﬁcers often on those against whom there is no reasonable suspicion. This may be
the kind of nightmare described in genuine totalitarian dystopias, or police states,
where neighbours act as informants upon one another. But as things are, the marginal
security beneﬁt of focusing resources on those against whom there is strong suspicion
of criminal activity is almost always higher than that which arises when focusing on
those against whom there is not strong suspicion. Thus, in practice, we have, in effect,
a liability model, even if its governance appears to be efﬁcacy-focused.
This point can be further enforced with claims about institutional culture. Even
though, as I have described, the legal sense of proportionality only very weakly
demands any consideration of culpability, it is natural, nonetheless, for those imple-
menting the rules as stated to ‘read in’ culpability considerations. A recent study
shows that, despite its formal status as a piece of enabling legislation, RIPA has had a
signiﬁcant effect on limiting the practice of covert policing across the UK, and is con-
sidered by many ofﬁcers to be excessively onerous.43
Nonetheless, if the liability model is guiding us, we would do better to implement it
in express regulations or codes of practice, rather than to depend upon the empirics to
© 2016 The Authors. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied Philosophy.
Liability to Deception and Manipulation 383
ensure its application. This is because the facts may change. It is in an important sense
a matter of serendipity that the instrumental model will not in general intrude upon
the known innocent or the stranger. That is to say, whereas the liability view asserts
that it is in principle permissible to engage in a greater intrusion upon those who are
involved in a higher degree of harm, the instrumental view only has as a likely outcome
that the more malicious will face more intrusions. Where there are exceptions to these
likely facts, the liability view and not the instrumental view gives reason against further
intrusion upon the innocent.
For example, undercover work can take place online, at a much lower level of
investment of resources, and this may change the equation described above: it may
become efﬁcient (from a pure crime-prevention perspective) to apply deceptive tactics
on those against whom there is no reasonable suspicion, in order to get leverage
against an online community. The general inﬁltration of forensically aware elements of
the internet might sow sufﬁcient distrust in order to reduce its functioning. If this is a
community that deals in, say, ﬁrearms or money laundering, such disruption is a use-
ful preventive tactic. There is an important question concerning how broadly such dis-
trust is useful sowed. If the instrumentalist goal of security is the only criterion at
work, it is reasonable to expect an excessively broad answer. Furthermore, the institu-
tional habit of seeking to get approval through RIPA may itself change. The courts
have provided several strong precedents of permitting cases to proceed in spite of sig-
niﬁcant departures from RIPA codes.44 This gives further reason to enact the liability
view in law.
Intelligence and Entrapment
Cases of intelligence-oriented manipulations also give rise to the important issue of
entrapment, about which there is room to make only a few brief remarks here. If peo-
ple can forfeit their right against being manipulated, does it follow that those already
involved in criminality can legitimately be manipulated into further criminality? The
manipulation of people into criminality can be useful in security terms. For example,
an undercover ofﬁcer makes contact with a person who works on the fringes of a crim-
inal organisation. With an eye to broadening a possible channel of intelligence, the
ofﬁcer encourages this person to become more involved with the group. Depending
on considerations of proportionality, the liability view allows this activity, and it is
more permissive of this activity in proportion to the gravity of the criminality for which
the target was initially culpable. Those who form loose associations with people who
may be involved in direct action protest and the aggravated trespass offences that typi-
cally accompany it are liable to little such treatment, since associating with people who
might perform aggravated trespass is not a very serious wrong. Those who are culpable
for distributing child pornography may, on the other hand, become liable to manipula-
tion into further such activity, where this would allow police to inﬁltrate the centre of
an organisation that deals in illicit images.
Does this means that those who are involved in low levels of criminality may be
manipulated up a ladder of increasingly higher levels of criminality, each justiﬁed on
the grounds of the previous act of wrongdoing, until at some point they are punished
for a very serious transgression? That is not an attractive implication. It also does not
follow from the liability view. This is because one of the standard objections to
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punishing people for acts that the state has encouraged them to perform is also a rea-
son why people’s liability to manipulation will be limited. Thus, some argue that
entrapment is objectionable because it undermines the agency of the target, which is a
condition of criminal liability.45 A diminishment of agency is also a reason that the tar-
get’s culpability for a threat is reduced.
Some argue that there is a general reason for the police not to commission crime.46
That is not inconsistent with the position I put forward here. In this case, it may
become moot that people may be liable to manipulation into wrongful acts, since there
is not a permissible institution that may carry out the manipulation. Alternatively, one
may hold that there is a range of limits on acceptable police behaviour in the area of
stings and entrapment,47 and accordingly these limit the cases in which intelligence-
based manipulation towards criminal acts may be used. In general, we may separate
the question of what treatment people make themselves liable to, from the question of
what treatment the police or the state may impose upon people. It is also theoretically
open that people may permissibly be manipulated without being liable to punishment
for the act that they committed while being manipulated. So it may be the case that
punishing someone as a result of an internet sting aimed at child molesters amounts
to draconian preventive detention48 or punishment based upon unjustiﬁed moral sub-
version49 – but it may also be the case that the intelligence-directed sting is warranted
on the grounds of liability to prevent a harm, even if punishment for the ensuing crim-
inal acts is not.
Concluding Remark
In this article I have laid the groundwork for the liability view of undercover policing.
It draws from our ideas about the ethics of personal self-defence. The view has the
implication that police action in this area should be directly sensitive to the wrongs of
its targets. Certain trends in policing, such as the shift towards intelligence models,
and the lower cost of mounting online covert operations, imply that this implication
will increasingly have practical manifestations. I proposed three ways in which the gov-
ernance of undercover policing should be structured in accordance with the liability
view. Two of these – proportionality to culpability, and recompense for complaints
that arise from epistemically or consequentially justiﬁed police actions – are not cur-
rently given proper due in the UK.
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before I was 35. It was the time when I wanted to have children, and for the last 18 months of our rela-
tionship he went to relationship counselling with me about the fact that I wanted children and he did
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of Evidence: HC 837’, 2013 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmhaff/837/
130205i.htm>.
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Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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by deceptive means’ (The Ethics of Policing [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], p. 133). He
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attempts to assault A, then B can legitimately be prevented from assaulting A by means of coercion’
(Miller op. cit., p. 247). So, justiﬁably enforceable rights include human rights, and the ‘enforcement’ of
a right can include the use of coercion. This would seem to suggest that those who act wrongly make
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between cases that involve the liability of somebody who intends to commit a wrong, and harms to inno-
cents that are on balance justiﬁed by their ends. He sums up his view as, ‘harmful and normally immoral
methods are on occasion necessary to realize the fundamental end of policing’, offering several examples,
including, ‘a drug dealer might have to be deceived if a drug ring is to be smashed, a blind eye might
have to be turned to the minor illegal activity of an informant if the ﬂow of important information he pro-
vides in relation to serious crimes is to continue’ (Miller op. cit., p. 264). Consistent attention to liability
would draw a sharp distinction between those cases, where the ﬁrst involves the deception of someone
who is liable to such treatment, whereas the second involves harms to innocent victims of the informant’s
minor crimes.
5 The norm is present in the requirement of reasonable suspicion that attaches to searches, as governed by
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984). The concept of liability will naturally extend beyond the
context of the regulation of undercover work into other areas of policing, both those involving deception
and manipulation, and those that do not. I focus on the undercover context in this article because its gov-
ernance is so far from taking account of the idea of liability, and because this form of policework in partic-
ular warrants scrutiny.
6 Gary T. Marx, ‘Ethics of undercover investigations’ in D. Callahan, P. Singer & R. Chadwick (eds) Ency-
clopedia of Applied Ethics (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2011), p. 446.
7 Michael Walzer, ‘Political action: The problem of dirty hands’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 2 (1973): 160–
80, at pp. 176–7.
8 Michael Hayden, ‘Keynote address: Cybersurveillance in the post-Snowden age’, 2015 <http://www.law-
fareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-episode-108-general-michael-hayden-cybersurveillance-post-snowden-age at
13:10>.
9 Frances Stonor Saunders, ‘Stuck on the ﬂypaper’ London Review of Books 9 April (2015): 3–10.
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11 A distinct objection may be raised against this case that is consistent with the instrumental view. This is
that the beneﬁts of the actions of the ofﬁcer could not be expected to outweigh their very serious costs. I
add to this argument a further objection that is inconsistent with the instrumental view: that no special con-
sideration appears to have been given to the non-culpability of the target.
12 Clive Walker & Kingsley Hyland, ‘Undercover policing and underwhelming laws’, Criminal Law Review 8
(2014): 572.
13 Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘Some ruminations on rights’ in W. Parent (ed.) Rights, Restitution, and Risk:
Essays, in Moral Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 51.
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here holds that the prevention of possible harm does extra explanatory work. A version of the former kind
of view is advanced by Christopher Heath Wellman in defending ‘the rights forfeiture theory of punish-
ment,’ which is ‘the view that we should concentrate on which rights wrongdoers forfeit because this for-
feiture is necessary and sufﬁcient to explain the permissibility of punishment.’ [‘The rights forfeiture
theory of punishment’, Ethics 122 (2012): 371–93, at p. 375.] That seems an anaemic account of punish-
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wrongfully creating a threat one makes oneself liable to greater preventive harm.
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